One Nation, One Election in India: Constitutional Challenges, Federal Dynamics and Implications for Democratic Governance

The proposal for simultaneous elections, popularly described as One Nation, One Election (ONOE) has developed from a recurring electoral reform debate into an important constitutional proposal in India. This study examines its historical evolution, constitutional requirements, federal implications, administrative rationale and possible consequences for democratic governance. The substantive analysis covers institutional developments up to 31 December 2024 and is based primarily on secondary documentary and statistical evidence. A qualitative, descriptive analytical and comparative research design is adopted. The analysis indicates that simultaneous elections involve substantially more than aligning polling dates. A durable common electoral cycle requires mechanisms for dealing with premature dissolution, loss of legislative confidence and exceptional elections. The 2024 constitutional proposal attempts to address these issues through an unexpired term mechanism under which a legislature elected after premature dissolution may serve only the remaining period of the common electoral cycle. Although synchronisation could reduce repeated administrative mobilisation and provide greater predictability in election management, and its overall fiscal and macroeconomic benefits remain empirically unsettled. The proposal also raises questions concerning parliamentary responsibility, State electoral autonomy, federal balance, voter behaviour and multi-level democratic accountability. The study concludes that ONOE constitutes a significant institutional redesign whose implications need to be assessed through constitutional, federal, administrative and democratic perspectives rather than through administrative efficiency alone.